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Law Review Summaries
This section will summarize recent law review articles on a
topic cbosen for its social significance which will vary in each
issue.
MODERN SOCIAL WELFARE LEGISLATION
N. Dorsen and S. D. Ross, T. I. Emerson, P. A. Freund, P. B. Kurland,
P. Murray, Equal Rights For Women: A Symposium on the Proposed
Constitutional Amendment, 6 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L.
REV. 215 (1971).
This symposium consists of six articles which closely explore the
proposed constitutional amendment which was recently passed by the
House of Representatives which reads:
Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress and the several States shall have the power, within
their respective jurisdictions, to enforce this article by appropriate legislation. H. R. J. Res. 264, 91st. Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969).
The articles composing the symposium were written by several of the
distinguished law professors who testified before the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary in September, 1970. Hearings on S. J. Res. 61 and S. J.
Res. 231 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970).
N. Dorsen and S. D. Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional
Amendment.
Noting that there is a wide new commitment to equal treatment of
the sexes and to the eradication of unjust laws that have exploited
women or prevented them from realizing their full potential, both
economically and personally, the authors state that there is still
resistance to an amendment on equal rights for women. They note
recent changes as well as contemporary examples of discrimination in
the public schools and universities. While boys are channeled into
college preparatory curricula to become future managers and professionals, girls are tracked into commercial courses to become future
secretaries or typists. The authors offer as a prime issue of consideration the point of whether the Supreme Court would treat sex
discrimination supported by state action as "invidious" and therefore
76
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conditionally justifiable only if a compelling governmental interest can
be demonstrated. The concept is reiterated that both courts and
legislatures have been unable or unwilling, in the present legal context,
to cope with the complex barriers that continue to confront women.
The passing of an Equal Rights Amendment would provide a powerful
impetus for legislative efforts as well as for individual re-examination of
behavioral patterns that result in sexual bias. Rather than providing for
sudden legislation partial to one sex, the authors point out that present
legislation, as for example, Department of Labor regulations pursuant
to the Federal Labor Standards Act and the 1963 Equal Pay Act,
require extension of minimum wage and overtime pay requirements of
one sex to the other. Alimony and support laws would not be wholly
abrogated, rather it would require a neutral and reciprocal approach to
alimony and support based on individual capacities. The amendment
would not mean the end of the draft, but would instead require
conscription of both men and women insofar as each individual meets
physical qualifications. The amendment would have an additional
salutory effect not achievable by legislation or litigation alone; its
adoption would be a final resolution of the fundamental policy
question in favor of strict equality of the sexes.
Recognizing that there could be public furor in that the amendment
would cause vast changes in many features of national life, the author
stresses that such transitions will occur only if they are absolutely
necessary; also, the courts must be entirely capable of laying down the
rules for a transitional period in a manner which will not create
excessive uncertainty or undue disruption.

P. A. Freund, The Equal Rights Amendment Is Not The Way.
The author warns that the nation should not look to the proposed
constitutional amendment as the panacea for equal rights for women.
The effectiveness of such an amendment must be juxtaposed to the
mandate created by judicial decision and Congressional legislation.
Rather than imposing a simple standard of sameness on the sexes in all
the multifarious roles regulated by law, the alternative legal course is to
achieve changes in the relative position of women. This could be
brought into being by using paramount federal standards to overcome
invidious classifications on the ground that they are presently unconstitutional.
The author offers some alternative suggestions, exploring the
possibility of using the regular legislative process in Congress. For
example, concrete guidelines are set forth in the April, 1970 Report of
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the President's Task Force on Women's Rights and Responsibilities.
Among these suggestions are that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 be
amended to empower the EEOC to enforce the law, and to extend
coverage to state and local governments and to teachers. Also suggested
is that Title IV and IX be amended to authorize the Attorney General
to assist in cases involving discrimination; even further, that Title II of
the Civil Rights Act be amended to prohibit discrimination because of
sex in public accommodations. Recommendations are made for
liberalized provisions for child care facilities, and the Fair Labor
Standards Act be amended to extend coverage of its equal pay
provisions to executive, administrative and professional employees.
It is noted that a few significant decisions of the Supreme Court in
well-chosen cases using the fourteenth amendment would have a highly
salutory effect. Decisions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act will
clarify the role of state laws regulating employment in light of the
statutory concept of bona fide occupational qualifications. The author
concludes that the real issue is not the legal status of women but the
integrity and responsibility of the law-making process itself.

P. B. Kurland, The Equal Rights Amendment: Some Problems of
Construction.
The author approaches the subject with certain stated biases; he
believes that the use of an amendment is clearly the best and exclusive
means of bringing about changes in governmental structure. It would be
the necessary means for protecting minorities from being discriminated
against by the majority, for protecting the unenfranchised against
discrimination by the enfranchised. Yet women are neither a minority
nor an unenfranchised group. The author's solution is appropriate
legislation rather than a constitutional amendment.
Believing that women suffer from unreasoned discrimination, he is of
the view that this unjustified discrimination does not derive primarily
from governmental action, except insofar as the government, as an
employers, behaves like other employers. The author notes a certain
amount of indecisiveness in the proposed amendment He believes that
the amendment's aims and purposes should be clearly delineated in its
legislative history. Congress should particularly indicate whether it is
fostering a "unisex" approach or one that bars only invidious
discrimination against women.
The conclusion is that a more appropriate solution would be
effectively administered legislation, directed to specific evils in lieu of a
broadly directed amendment. Congress and the States already possess

19711

Law Review Summaries

sufficient power to alleviate much of the very real discrimination now
suffered by women in American society. The Equal Rights Amendment
would add little, if any, to this power. A protracted struggle for its
adoption, however, could tax the public energies needed to effect the
exercise of this power; only martyrs enjoy Pyrrhic victories.

P. Murray, The Negro Women's Stake in tbe Equal Rights Amendment.
The author stresses that Negro women as a group have the most to
gain from the adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment because all
that has been said about the deprivations and frustrations of women
generally applies with special force to black women, who have been
doubly victimized by the twin immoralities of racial and sexual bias.
Noted is the position of the black woman as a mere breeder a "brood
mare" during the period of slavery; even today, despite the achievements and the fortitude which black women have displayed in the face
of unmitigated oppression, they remain the lowest and most vulnerable
social and economic group in the United States. Negro women don't
enjoy either the advantages of the idealization of "womanhood" and
"motherhood" which are implicit in our American mythology, or the
"protections" women possess which critics of the Equal Rights
Amendment are so zealous to preserve. The movement for black
liberation has not substantially improved their situation; they still must
contend with prejudice based on their sex.
Expanding upon these views, using historical background and
statistics, the author states that the adoption of the Equal Rights
Amendment would have certain advantages for black women not
realizable by other means. The affirmation of equal rights without
regard to sex would permit them to enjoy a constitutional status not
accorded them under the Civil War amendments. The psychological gain
from this constitutional recognition would be tremendous, reinforcing
their rights cognizable under the fourteenth amendment. This would
prevent a shift in the basis of discrimination from race to sex.
The article concludes that the Equal Rights Amendment strikes a
blow at the powerlessness which all women share but which Negro
women experience in intensified form. The full implementation of it
will enable women to achieve equal power with men in societal
decision-making. The presence of women in a more equitable proportion to their numbers, in the legislatures, on the courts, and in
leadership positions throughout society, is the best guarantee that their
rights will be protected. Women also represent a vast untapped
resource, the utilization of which may accelerate progress toward the
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solution of such problems as war, poverty, racism, and pollution. The
adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment would be an important step
toward a new era of human relations.
"A Little Dearer Than His Horse: " Legal Stereotypes and tbe Feminine
Personality.
This article delves into some striking factual background material in
order to justify the need for the Equal Rights for Women Amendment.
Economically, a woman is "protected" from exerting herself beyond
her limits at her job. At common law she had been literally
incorporated into her husband's identity. This concept has not aided
women in their constant attempt to assert their individuality and
independence; federal income tax regulations explicitly exhort women
to be fruitful child bearers-the more children the more exemptions.
Psychologically, it is contended that men themselves fear women,
either patently or subconsciously. Witness the witchcraft trials during
which almost all the victims of these purges were female. Perhaps the
belief that women possess greater sexual potency than men or their
primary role as progenitors of our species or their disciplinary effect
upon their children's personalities brings about this fear. Women suffer
more from mental illnesses than men. Circumstances which induce this
condition are: (1) emotional isolation of women at home; (2) hostility
exuded by men who she competes against; (3) the fear of women that
they aren't loved, and; (4) a feeling of powerlessness due to their
non-aggressive ideological indoctrination.
The legal structure of our society intrinsically fosters a cycle of
feminine dependence on men; since the law dictates that the male must
support the female, it follows that there is no necessity for any female
independence. There is also a "fear of success syndrome" in women
which is devastating in its inherently warped logic; a woman desires to
be successful but she is inhibited by the threat that such success will
manifest in her an image of not being feminine.
The article concludes its feminine study by admitting that the
proposed Equal Rights Amendment is necessary not to inject womanhood into its rightful status in society, but rather to merely insure that
the legal process itself will no longer thwart the objective of equality of
the sexes. Such hindrances as employment impediments and marital
disabilities are the crucial issues involved in the female's drive towards
equality. It will take good faith on the part of those who can
discriminate against women to fully implement the realization of equal
rights. Such an awesomely theoretical defender of women's equality as
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has been remiss in its
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stated objectives. Society's talent deficiencies can and will be alleviated
with the dawning of an enforced legal equality status for women.

R.A. Musgrave, A.M. Polinsky, Revenue Sbaring: A Critical View, 8
HARV. J. LEGIS. 197 (1971).
Emphasis is placed on the shift away from the preoccupation with
federal financing toward a more comprehensive view of the fiscal
structure, encompassing the federal, state and local levels. It is noted
that the fiscal plight of the cities and the need for expanded social
problems are the crux of the problem. Reference is made to the early
role and purpose of revenue sharing as espoused by Walter Hell in 1964.
At that time, economists were concerned with countering a slackening
economy and averting the repetition of stagnation by fiscal drag that
had occurred during the late fifties. The outlook was for a steadily
rising full-employment surplus and widespread fiscal deficiencies at the
state and local level. Rather than an optimistic outlook with a
speculated $45 billion surplus there has been premature tax reduction,
less than hoped for cutbacks in defense spending, along with increases
in programs of both the Johnson and Nixon administrations.
The article notes that a budget surplus of $10 billion will be needed
if the Administration's housing goals are to be implemented. With
projected expenditures at the state and local level exceeding those of
1971 by $84.6 billion (projected 1971 state and local expenditures will
be $96.8 billion, 1975 expenditures are estimated as $191.4 billion),
there is a need for increased taxes at the state level. It is significant that
in place of the 1964 outlook for a large and freely available dividend,
combined with a widespread deficiency at the state-local level, that
only a limited federal surplus is available. State and local resources will
keep approximately in step with rising costs of existing programs, and
new programs oriented toward poverty and disadvantaged groups will
be called for. It is projected in "no strings" revenue sharing that the
federal function will cost between $10 and $15 billion. This alone
might well absorb the available slack in the federal budget to include
such urgent problems as rehabilitation of slums. Arguments are put
forth for "Black versus categorical transfers," as well as "outright versus
matching grants." Consideration is given to "tax credits" and "transfering expenditure functions." A thorough look is aimed at "horizontal
imbalance and equalization" as they specifically relate to dealing with
more adequate social programs relating to poverty. One of the major
conclusions noted by the report is the existing imbalances among the
states.
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Approaching the problem of need, the report notes that 50 per cent
of the poor are outside metropolitan areas. Within metropolitan areas
the incidence of poverty is not a core city phenomenon; about 60 per
cent of the poor are located in central cities while 40 per cent are
located in suburbia. The report concludes that revenue sharing modified
by an income-type capacity variable would do little to solve the
problem. It recommends a fiscal system where the distribution is from
the federal government to localities in line with their share of such
national needs. Although a more complicated system than has been
proposed, the objective could be met more effectively by federal
assumption of responsibility for the financing of the welfare system,
coupled with a partial federal financing of minimum levels of primary
and secondary education.

H. J. Daniels, Judicial and Legislative Remedies for Substandard
Housing: Landlord-Tenant Law Reform in tbe Districtof Columbia, 59
GEO. L. J. 909 (1971).
This article, written by the draftsman of the Landlord-Tenant
Regulations enacted in 1970 by the District of Columbia City Council,
analyzes the panoply of rights now available to tenants in the District
and concludes that the District's experience in this area is applicable to
any urban jurisdiction. Housing code enforcement, both through
governmental and more recently, through tenant action, has emerged as
the primary weapon in halting further expansion of slum conditions
until federal housing subsidy programs become more effective. Most
ordinances rely solely on governmental efforts to gain compliance due
to the negative attitudes which exist toward tenant involvement in the
enforcement of housing standards. The article reviews the trends
toward greater tenant involvement in code enforcement and the related
judicial and legislative reform of traditional landlord-tenant law; the
indications are that the point of departure is the code enforcement
experience of the District of Columbia and the recently adopted
amendments to the Housing Regulations of the District of Columbia.
The analysis of the D.C. situation should provide useful guidelines to
draftsmen of municipal housing codes and proponents of tenants' rights
legislation.
Extensive public hearings held by the District of Columbia City
Council in the spring of 1969 generated concern over the city's inability
to secure compliance with code standards. As a result, the Council
decided to draft municipal regulations to strengthen tenant rights and
remedies in two ways;
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1. by imposing economic sanctions to stimulate landlord compliance
with housing standards; and
2. by reforming unfair leasing arrangements thrust upon tenants as a
partial consequence of the unequal bargaining power between
landlord and tenant.
These efforts ultimately produced the District of Columbia Landlord-Tenant Regulations which passed the Council in June, 1970, D.C.
Housing Reg. § § 2901-14 (1970). These regulations build upon recent
landmark cases decided in the District of Columbia, in which courts
applied contract principles to a lease, entended the warranty of
habitability doctrine to leases involving low income urban tenants, and
finally, circumscribed a landlord's interfering with tenant efforts to
secure decent housing. Briefly, the regulations provide that the lease or
rental agreement for an "unsafe or unsanitary" dwelling unit is void,
whether the conditions existed at the inception of, or arose during, the
tenancy. The regulations create by operation of law, in every lease or
rental agreement, an implied warranty that the dwelling unit is in
compliance with the housing code. The regulations also prohibit
retaliatory actions taken by the landlord in reprisal for specified tenant
actions and treat such diverse problems as exculpatory clauses and
security deposits.
E. J. Morris, Lawyers Mobilize for Housing and Urban Renewal, 57
A.B.A.J. 158 (1971).
The author states that the development of housing and urban
renewal projects, through a combination of government aid and private
enterprise, is a relatively new phenomenon in the field of real estate
law. This trend is likely to intensify and create an increasingly
expanded area of activity for lawyers, whether private practitioners or
government employees. In view of this, the American Bar Association
created the Special Committee on Housing and Urban Development
Law in 1967; three years later a pilot program was begun to stimulate
the development of more law. Moderate-income housing and urban
development was the general aim of the program; specifically, the goal
was to train more lawyers in the field.
The Committee decided to set up pilot programs in each of the cities
where its members practiced law. This was to be done jointly with the
local bar associations and other local groups active in the field. The
article describes the operations of each of the various city projects and
their particular problems and accomplishments, emphasizing that in
each of these activities cooperation is carefully maintained with the
local bar association and the local attorney handling the project.
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The author concludes by stating that the Committee's national office
will make available its resources to help local groups organize similar
local offices. This approach, it is hoped, will open up a socially
important and lucrative area of the law to practitioners throughout the
United States, in accordance with the objectives as set forth in the
resolution of the Board of Governors setting up the Committee.

Restitution for Benefits Voluntarily Conferred Upon Government: A
Poverty Law Remedy, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 515 (1971).
Noting that disabilities of the poor spring not from want of a legal
remedy, but from their inability to obtain these remedies, the article is
concerned with providing not new rights nor new agencies to enforce
the rights of the poor, but a revival of the venerable remedy of
restitution for necessaries supplied by a volunteer. By adopting this
remedy to modern needs, benefactors could be compensated in proper
circumstances for supplying the poor with essential benefits wrongfully
withheld by government. It is emphasized that the general rule denying
restitution to one who voluntarily confers a benefit upon another has
exceptions. There is the example of the grocer who supplies food to a
deserted wife being entitled to restitution from the husband for the
benefit he has conferred by discharging the husband's legal duty to
support his wife; also, the available remedy for necessaries furnished to
infants, insane persons and paupers. These benefits are conferred upon
a defendant by the discharge of his legal duty, not the benefit to the
recipient of the goods or services themselves. If the defendant is the
government, such reasons for denying the validity of this solution is
that restitution is never permitted for benefits conferred voluntarily;
also, recovery has been denied on the ground that the proper remedy is
a mandamus action requiring the government to discharge its duty.
The article considers that restitution usually has been granted only
after the government has failed or refused to act despite requests that it
do so; also, a failure to notify the government of the intention to provide
necessaries has barred recovery. This notice requirement serves two
useful functions; it protects the government from unexpected claims
and it assures the government an opportunity to correct its own errors.
Examples are given which show that frequently the notice requirement
has been applied too mechanistically. Problems of statutory language
and contract requisites are shown as well as examples of applied
self-interest. The intricate question of sovereign immunity is explored;
reference is made to those states which have and have not consented to
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be sued; the United States has surrendered its immunity by the Tucker
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1964), whereby consent has been given to
be sued on contracts express and implied. An action for restitution
against government may succeed if it is viewed as a suit for
compensation, but fail if it is considered as an attempt to compel
government action. As an alternative, an analysis of equitable subrogation is offered, as when a volunteer responds to the government's
failure to provide necessaries to a poverty victim. In this situation the
benefactor's role is analogous to that of an equitable assignee of the
victim's claim.
Restitution would be most easily applied when a government
withholds necessaries from a relatively small group of persons without
claim of right. For example, when an agency withholds public
assistance payments from welfare rights activists because they have
demonstrated against the agency's practices, the agency is able to
withhold benefits without claiming a right to do so; it knows the victim
has no effective remedy. The consequences of liability are not likely to
be awesome because the government is required only to pay for
necessaries it was obliged to provide originally. If there has been
previous litigation in the claimants favor no legitimate discretionary
function remains and courts feel no reluctance to permit restitution if
the default continues after the final judgment. Generally, the government's default is neither conceded nor established by previous
litigation; the government either denies that it had a duty, claims that it
fulfilled its duty, or contends its failure to do so was justified. When the
existence or scope of the government's duty is determined after the fact
by a court, the threat of large and unexpected claims becomes credible.
If the government is held liable for defaults of a duty it did not know
existed, unexpected claims are entirely possible.
The article suggests that modern governments, operating under an
intricate web of constitutions, statutes, charters, regulations and
judicial decisions rarely find their duties stated in a single explicit
command. To concede the unavailability of the remedy when duties are
inexplicit is to make it inapplicable to some of our most persistent
social problems, such as racial discrimination and exploitation of
disadvantaged workers. The ultimate conclusion is that a modest
expansion of the original concept, encompassing situations in which the
government's breach of duty is less blatant but equally indisputable,
would make this remedy available in the numerous instances in which
the poor have been deprived of benefits solely because their poverty
prevents them from pursuing traditional legal remedies.
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The Implied Warranty of Habitability in Landlord-Tenant Relations: A
Proposal for Statutory Development, 12 WM. & M. L. REV. 580
(1971).
At early common law, there were no implied warranties between
landlord and tenants; the landlord could only be held responsible if he
was guilty of purposely concealing a defect by fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation, or if the defect was latent. The tenant was charged
with full responsibility for the condition and repair of the property so
that even in the case of total destruction, the obligation to pay rent
continued. The doctrine of caveat emptor prevailed unscathed and
strictly applicable. When it was determined that caveat emptor was too
harsh, this slight deviance was brought about by the fact that in cases of
short term leases there is no time for inspection, immediate possession
being of paramount importance. Relief has been extended to tenants
when a structure was unfinished and a lease had been executed prior to
the completion of the structure or if it was determined that a structure
was uninhabitable a legal fiction was employed by the court to offer
relief to the tenant called constructive eviction; this doctrine equates
the deplorable conditions to an actual physical eviction.
The article states that as of the date of its writing the common law
rules continue to represent the clear majority holding. However, a trend
away from strict adherence to the rules of the past is perceivable. For
example, the covenant of possession implies not only that the tenant
will be able to physically occupy the premises on the date of delivery of
possession, but that he will also be able to use the premises for its
intended purpose. Furthermore, the facilities should remain in a
condition which renders the property usable during the entire term of
the lease. It is clear that the common law is on the side of the landlord,
but passage of time and a change in society have made necessary the
rights of a tenant; neither should totally prevail over the other, there
must be equity.
A compromise solution is proposed since the increase in the rights
and protection of the tenant offered by the warranty of habitability
could mushroom to the point of suppressing the rights of the landlord.
Initially, a housing code should specifically indicate the defects which
will be deemed material, stating the defects that a landlord will be liable
for if left uncorrected. It should be provided that the tenant is not
allowed to take any action except that specified by statute and if a
defect is certified then the landlord is given a specified period of time in
which to make repairs. A failure to repair would allow the tenant to
vacate the premises absolving him from rent; or he may pay rent into
escrow or use a portion of the rent to make necessary repairs. The
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option would depend on the extent of the defect. The only solution,
according to the article, is a comprehensive housing code with
completely equitable standards and strict compliance to it by both
landlords and tenants.
G. Lefcoe, HUD'S Autbority to Mandate Tenants' Rigbts in Public
Housing, 80YALE L. J.463 (1971).
The case is presented that there are sensible statutory limits on the
discretion of the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban
Development even when it comes to trying to protect those in public
housing from harsh treatment. This contention is based upon the
congressional design of the public housing program with its strong
preference for localized management control. The author presents the
limitations on HUD's authority, pointing out that if neither a state
enabling statute nor a local government need is present, federal law
stops HUD from meeting out funds in the locality.
The article states that after examining the various statutes only a few
scraps can be found to support HUD's practice of treating grievance
procedures or lease provisions; even further it suggests that Congress'
intention was that the tasks of tenant-management relations be resolved
on a local level, that tenants share fully in working out these
relationships, and that HUD serve mainly as a financier of this
accommodation where funds are necessary. The author specifically
proposes: (1) mandatory lease forms arrived at as the result of
negotiations between representatives of tenants' organizations and
management; and (2) that the Uniform Commercial Code's implied
warranties of fitness and merchantability be extended to leases.
A discussion of the constitutional basis for HUD's authority through
a presentation of the case law in this area is presented. The author
points out in particular, the insignificant distinction between public
housing and Interest Subsidy Programs for the purposes of a constitutional adjudication. The Residential Segregation cases are presented as a
model for assessing HUD's responsibility to guard the constitutional
rights of tenants. The conclusion is that HUD has some specific base of
authority, derived from either the housing statutes or recent constitutional decisions, for mandating many, although not all of the
negotiators' agreements. However, HUD can probably not take the next
logical step and impose its own lease and grievance models upon local
authorities.
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E. S. George, Low-Income Housing and tbe Equal Protection Clause, 56
CORNELL L. REV.343 (1971).
The author describes low-income housing as one of our most pressing
domestic problems, contending that denial of low-income housing is a
denial of equal protection as evidenced by a number of recent cases.
Proceeding on this theory, the right to equal housing opportunities can
be interpreted in two different ways; it can mean either a right not to
be excluded from areas in which low-income housing units can be built
or an unqualified right to have such units built. Usually, equal
protection requires only that the legislation bear a reasonable relation
to a legitimate governmental objective. The equal protection decisions
evince a sliding scale approach to the determination of the invidiousness
of a particular discriminatory practice; the less suspect the classification
or the less important the interest, the less likely it is the court will make
a finding of discrimination. In suspect classification cases, the courts
have indicated that apart from the nature of classification, voting, the
right to earn a living, housing, marriage and education are fundamental
interests. The Supreme Court held in Block v. Hirsb, 256 U.S. 135,
156 (1921), that "housing is a necessary of life." The author states here
that this fundamental right to housing extends to zoning practices that
would tend to be exclusionary in nature.
The court, in evaluating a housing situation, looks to the historical
background in a neighborhood to determine the potential impact or
effect of legislation in light of this background. In view of the historical
and social setting, the courts must determine whether the measure's
ultimate impact will be to perpetuate residential segregation. Thus, even
if the evidence is insufficient to demonstrate the inevitable perpetration
of discrimination, it may be sufficient to prove authorization or
encouragement and hence establish a violation of equal protection.
Where the zoning classification of a relatively restricted area is in issue,
the courts need only adjudicate the discriminatory effect of that
classification. It is maintained that most housing cases under consideration have arisen in situations when a particular housing project has been
blocked. The most suitable remedy, therefore, is to enjoin defendants
from prohibiting the construction of the project on the ground of a
zoning violation.
The article points out that not only is a person entitled to equal
housing, but also to a right to decent housing. Although the author
indicates that no specific case in point has confronted the courts, this
issue has been presented in the context of public housing in other cases.
The conclusion is that the equal protection clause provides an
important vehicle for alleviating problems in the area of public housing
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and in bringing about an integrated neighborhood environment.
Furthermore, it is suggested that since the courts have previously
assisted minority groups attain their rights they can extend this helping
hand to cover the poor as a class, on the theory that they have been
deprived of an equal opportunity.
R. H. Olson, Jr., Employment DiscriminationLitigation: New Priorities
in the Struggle for Black Equality, 6 HARV. CIV.RIGHTS - CIV. LIB.
L. REV. 20 (1970).
Primarily, all litigation activity of civil rights organizations has been
focused upon achieving equal educational opportunities; little improvement has been made in the housing, income and employment levels of
blacks. The central obstacle in the struggle for black equality is an
economic one, brought about by the disparity between black and white
incomes, approximately one third of which is attributable to illegal
racial discrimination in employment. This article centers not upon
education but rather on litigation strategy in the areas of job and
residential discrimination.
Income and job strategy would enable blacks to purchase better
housing, food and health services, improve the stability of black
families, and decrease the number of central city blacks requiring
income supplements. It would also free local governmental funds for
other needed improvements. By obtaining employment for those who
are able to work, the arguments for income support are made more
compatible with the work ethic, which is still the socially accepted
norm even by those without adequate job opportunities. The author
notes the inequality of economics whereby the family income of the
non-white has remained approximately fifty-five percent of that of
whites since World War II. With black families numbering larger by
number of family members, twenty-nine percent of all black families
were below the "poverty" level and thirty-five percent of all black
persons were classified as poor. The disproportionate concentration of
non-whites in low-paying occupations is a greater factor in the low level
of non-white income than is unemployment. The failure of education
has also played a major role in the inability of the black to market
himself. In 1959, the non-white male college graduate earned less than
the white male who never attended high school. Fantastically, a
Department of Labor analysis made in 1966 indicated that the income
of a non-white man decreased relative to that of his white peer as their
education increased.
Discrimination is studied in the employment area. Such areas are
covered as the firing or non-hiring of a black worker comparable in
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terms of economic productivity to the white worker, occupational
discrimination whereby a qualified black worker is refused the
opportunity to hold a higher status-pay position and discrimination of
wage levels meted to black and white workers of comparable
productivity in the same occupation. Discrimination is fostered by the
black worker receiving a smaller return of his investment of time and
money invested in his schooling. Consequently, the incentive to
complete high school and acquire higher education is significantly
reduced for blacks. Efforts to improve the level of education and job
experiences among blacks will have little effect on black income if job
discrimination is not eliminated.
The author also covers the topic of residential segregation and
provides statistics showing the rise in black population centered within
twelve central cities. Blacks do not live in ghettos because they cannot
afford to live elsewhere; racial discrimination restricts residential
choices of blacks to the central city. The effects of residential
segregation and center city concentrations result in a decrease in
employment opportunities for center city residents with a corresponding increase in the cost of center city services, such as education,
transportation, housing and health care. With employers discriminating
for a variety of reasons in addition to the mistaken belief that the white
is a more productive worker, the answer to alleviate the problems
holding back opportunity and economic betterment for the nation's
blacks is litigation. The author states why public litigation is necessary;
the success of anti-job discrimination litigation is measured by the
extent to which it opens up equal employment opportunities. One of
several examples given is the availability of injunctions against public
agencies which contract with discriminatory employers who are
establishing de facto racial quotas. Thus, whites who contend they are
victims of racial discrimination would have no constitutionallyprotected interest in the continued enjoyment of employment advantages based on past discrimination, rather than on skill.
Particular targets for litigation strategy, such as large national firms
and employment agencies, both in the public and private realms are
pointed out. Also, the Labor Department has been notoriously lax in
enforcing the nondiscrimination requirements of the programs it
administers. The author also covers low priority targets .of discrimination, such as attacks against the craft unions and high priority
attacks against residential discrimination, offering appropriate solutions. The author concludes that since legal resources available to
eliminate discrimination against black Americans are limited, they must
be used to their maximum effectiveness. He notes that if school
segregation were eliminated and the educational opportunities for black
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children were improved, black youths would still be unable to enter the
labor market on comparable terms with white youths. The traditional
priorities must be reassessed; a job-oriented, rather than an educationoriented litigation strategy is now required.
Property Insurance and the American Ghetto: A Study in Social
Irresponsibility,44 S. CAL. L. REV. 218 (1970).
The initial premise is that citizens living in ghettos and surrounding
neighborhoods do not have available to them property insurance, or
that is is offered to them at unreasonable rates. If fire destroys a ghetto
dwelling, disaster ensues because of the total obliteration of the
resident's lifetime accumulation of worldly goods. This article deals
with this as yet unsolved problem affecting the poor. It is noted that
the present system of property insurance discriminates against the
growth of ghetto owned and operated businesses, contributes to the
deteriorating physical structure of residences in the area, impedes the
free flow of capital into the ghetto and leads to an inadequate
availability of insurance in the ghetto market. Even further, it is
suggested that racially oriented discrimination plays a significant role
and that this form of discrimination violates the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the
anti-trust laws.
This premise is followed through by describing the fire and casualty
market structure, the probability of loss, market division and statistics
affecting company profit margins. Statistics indicate that the average
rate of return of the twenty largest property insurers is 14.0%
compared with average rate of return of 11.7% reported by Fortune
Magazine's Top 500 Companies in 1968. The article further covers
rationales and means of segregating ghetto risks. The average suburban
resident may purchase coverage beyond fire protection to include
damage caused by windstorms, hail, explosions, vandalism, malicious
mischief, riot, riot attending a strike, civil commotion, aircraft vehicles
and smoke. Yet the ghetto property owner, be he a businessman or
resident owner, can only buy fire and extended coverage protection. He
is denied any extended protection whether or not he could afford it,
which would be available to the suburbanite. Examples are given by
geographic divisions represented by race as well as economics; specifically, the Watts area, an economically sub-standard area in Los Angeles,
is compared to the Crenshaw district, an adjacent middle class black
area. Further examples are given of selective selling of "the package
policy" as a means of segregation. Also examined are subsidiary
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regulations which when applied to ghetto residents relegates their risk
insurance into a separate secondary-risk subsidiary corporation, resulting in higher rates.
Other examples are shown which separate ghetto risks from the
normal market areas including "redlining" and the insistance on the
installation of expensive new safety devices which are prohibitively
expensive for many small businesses. "Redlining" is a process by which
entire areas will be subject to a blanket refusal to underwrite higher
deductibles. Industry explanation is given in that the insurance
companies had experienced unprecedented underwriting losses in
ghetto areas. Insurance companies felt this uncertainty could not be
recouped through a nationwide spreading of the risk since only ghetto
areas should properly pay and that the industry could not subsidize
these problems since it had been suffering heavy losses throughout the
country.
The article describes in detail "The Fair Plan" (Fair Access to
Insurance Requirements) enacted by the HUD Act of 1968. This plan
covers reinsurance as well as encourages industry participation. This
plan is described in depth as regards its initiation in California and
Ohio. The problems which the plan has encountered are noted, along
with solutions to these problems and present day limitations. Alternatives are given as well as suggested means for implementing the present
1968 HUD Act. The article concludes that the insurance structure is a
socially counter-productive structure and its socially deleterious results
must be modified to assure equality of commercial opportunity and
property transferability in ghetto areas. It is not only unfair to deny a
man insurance coverage because he lives in an area privately designated
to be "undesirable"-it is nothing less than a form of social suicide.

The Central City Insurance Crises: Experience Under the Urban
Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968, 38U. CHI. L. REV.
665 (1971).
Insurance for property owners became an issue of major concern
after the urban riots of the mid 1960's. Insurers were reluctant to write
policies for property owners in ghetto areas; even at exorbitant rates
insurance protection could not be obtained. The rise in premium rates,
according to this article, would eventually price the insurer out of the
low risk market, thus forcing him to raise rates even more due to the
higher loss ratio. Furthermore, the insurance industry gradually divided
itself into two categories: standard companies competed for better
risks, thereby excluding most ghetto areas, and second line companies
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insured at increased rates the high risk properties major companies
refused to insure. To prevent disaster, insurance companies insuring the
central city areas used methods called "redlining" which in effect
redlined certain areas of the city which were forbidden territory, and
insurance agents were forbidden to write policies. Establishments such
as liquor stores, cleaning establishments, and drug stores, main targets
of rioters, found it virtually impossible to get coverage.
The article points out two problems which are a result of not being
able to obtain insurance. First, when shop owners continued to operate
without insurance, the customer ended up paying more for the
products, and secondly, the physical surroundings deteriorated at an
accelerated rate. In 1968, to contribute to the alleviation of this
problem, Congress passed the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1749 bbb (Supp. V, 1965-69), which provided
the incentive that the federal government was financially backing the
program. The reinsurance provisions applied only to riot-caused
damages, not to all losses. The Act is committed to the elimination of
"environmental hazards" as a relevant criterion in determining the rates
at which insurance premiums will be written. An "environmental
hazard" is defined in the act as "any hazardous condition that might
give rise to loss under an insurance contract, but which is beyond the
control of the property owner," 12U.S.C. § 1749 bbb-2 (a) (1).
The Illinois FAIR plan is used as a case study to look at the program.
This plan authorizes the establishment of an all industry placement
facility and provides for free inspection of all properties sought to be
insured under it. The facility accepts applicants and determines which
company is to provide the insurance. Policies are written for one year
and become effective upon full payment of the year's premium.
Although insurance coverage is usually offered under the plans, rates
have skyrocketed. The plan has not been the answer to the problem. It
has not provided the required assistance to its intended beneficiaries,
the inner cities, rather it has been a boon to the insurance companies.
There have been proposals that have been offered for reform. The
Crime Insurance Amendment of the Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-609, 84 Stat. 1770 (1970), provided
insurance at "affordable rates" purchased directly through the federal
government. The problem with this amendment is that "affordable
rates" were never defined. The need is to define precisely what these
rates will be and make the insurance available to all property owners.
There are of course, outcries against federal intervention and interference, but it has become a necessity in this area.
A solution to be considered is to make insurance a public utility with
the insurance companies carrying the financial burden of the publicutility-type operation. The conclusion is on a pessimistic note; the

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. I

Federal Reinsurance Act has failed to eliminate insurance unavailability
in urban areas and to rehabilitate the central cities. This protection is
absolutely necessary and the Crime Insurance Amendment is a step in
the right direction, yet it must be carried even further.
The Landlord's Emerging Responsibility for Tenant Security, 71
COLUM. L. REV. 275 (1971).
The article declares at the outset that the duty owed by a landlord to
his tenant is one of a contractual nature and also one grounded in tort
- a logical extension of the landlord's control of common areas. With
the rash of crimes in recent years, it has been widely accepted that the
unauthorized entrance of criminal intruders was foreseeable, and that
the landlord was under a duty to protect tenants from criminal acts
perpetrated by such intruders. Traditionally, the owner or occupier of
land has been held to owe an affirmative duty of reasonable care to his
or her invitees and the recent trend has been to extend the scope of this
landowner's duty to licensees and trespassers as well.
In tort law the landlord was held liable: (1) for concealed dangerous
conditions which existed from the inception of the lease and of which
the landlord knew or had reason to know; (2) for conditions that might
pose a danger to persons outside the premises; (3) in the case of
premises leased for public use, for conditions that might pose an
unreasonable risk of harm to those who might enter; (4) throughout the
term of the lease, for conditions in parts of the premises, such as
entrances and hallways, which are available for common use and over
which the landlord retains control; (5) in a minority of jurisdictions, for
injuries, whether to tenants or others arising out of conditions which
the landlord should have corrected in fulfilling either a contractual
agreement or a statutory duty to repair. It is under these last two items
that there arises a duty of care to protect tenants on the part of the
landlord. At common law, there was no duty on the part of the
landlord, but his economic position has so improved over the years as
to put him in a position to assume the responsibilities of protection.
Now a contractual duty is placed upon the landlord; the traditional
view of the lease has been changed by treating it as a contract rather
than as a means to convey a piece of property. By applying the doctrine
that clauses can be implied in contracts wherever public policy so
demands, protection of tenants can be implied. It is by this developing
scheme that there seems to be an implied warranty of habitability with
all it entails. The tenant was finally given some consideration in Kline v.
1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., No. 23, 401 (D.C. Cir.,
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Aug. 6, 1970), in which it was held that a duty of protection arose
from the logic of the landlord-tenant situation itself. An intervening
criminal act should not cut off the landlord's duty to protect in modern
urban multiple dwellings, because he was deemed to be best suited to
take the necessary protective precautions. The case shed new light on
exculpatory clauses, used by landlords to absolve their liability, putting
a tenant in a "take it or leave it" situation. The tenant's position was
enhanced and the Kline case left ambiguities which may benefit the
tenant; at least it leaves room for implication. The courts can use Kline
to invoke a warranty of protection which could break the stranglehold
the landlord has traditionally had in his favor in litigation.
For the protection deemed necessary by Kline, the court felt that the
increase in rents, which is inevitable with the addition of a service, will
help defray the cost of protection and keep insurance rates down. In
concluding, the article states that Kline in utilizing alternative tort and
contract theories has passed a powerful tool into the hands of the
apartment dweller; yet the process by which the decision was reached
leaves an area of ambiguity with regard to its application. The most
valuable potential utility of the decision is that it may impel legislative
action to begin to deal with problems of crime and urban decay that
permeate our society.
Rent Witbbolding for Minnesota: A Proposal, 55 MINN. L. REV. 82
(1970).
The stated purpose of the article is to determine whether the
adoption of a rent withholding statute is necessary for the welfare of
the people of Minnesota. This is determined by examining the housing
situation in Minnesota and in initially deciding whether public welfare
considerations of that state call for legislative action to alleviate
problems in the sphere of housing. If the housing problem of our cities
can be solved we will need an adequate supply of relocation housing;
this encompasses more housing for the poor coupled with loans, grants
and other incentives to low income homeowners, landlords and tenants.
Any program should allow property to be repaired and maintained
according to redefined housing code standards without merely increasing housing costs for the poor. At present the remedies available to a
tenant against his landlord (with whom there is a contractual
relationship) are inadequate, especially when compared to the remedies
available to a tenant against his neighbor (e.g., he can bring an action in
equity to have a nuisance abated).
The inadequacy of housing codes as a device for compelling the
proper maintenance of dwellings has been attributed to the lack of
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remedies available to punish a landlord's violations and to inadequately
staffed inspection departments. The efficient enforcement of housing
codes is also retarded by the lack of coordination between inspecting
departments and prosecuting departments; further, there exists ambiguities within the language of housing codes themselves.
The article raises the question of who is best able to bear the burden
of repair. It is noted that the landlord generally has no duty to repair in
the absence of an express covenant; even if there is an express
convenant which the landlord fails to keep, the tenant's only practical
remedy is to vacate the premises unless he wants to sue the landlord for
damages-an improbable alternative for the alienated poor. Since the
only other alternative, housing code enforcement, has failed to provide
the tenants with the tool they need to secure decent housing,
something more is needed. One possibility is a rent withholding statute
that places the burden of repair upon the landlord and provides the
tenant with a quick, effective remedy in the event of a landlord's
non-compliance with the housing code. Rent withholding statutes are
of two basic types: under one type, the withholding action is instituted
by a public agency (e.g., a welfare department or by the building or
housing department); in the other, action is initiated by the tenant
either individually or jointly with others. Under either statute, the kind
of violation necessary before rents will be witheld is usually one which
is certified as causing the building to be "unfit for human habitation,"
or "dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health." The
conclusion is that there is no doubt that housing codes strictly enforced
can help prevent decent housing from deteriorating into a slum and that
a rent withholding statute would be the harbinger of efficacious code
enforcement if coupled with adequate financial assistance.

S. F. Gold, The Failure of tbe Work Incentive (WIN) Program,119 U.
PA. L. REV.485 (1971).
The Work Incentive Program (WIN) appeared doomed from its
inception as another ill-conceived program designed to counter poverty
in America. WIN was established as a "service program" so that it could
be distinguished from those programs solely providing monetary aid to
the poor. This was intended to "dress up" the concept of welfare and
to instill in it a respectability heretofore lacking. The original bill was
entitled, "Grants to States for Aid to Dependent Children" (ADC), and
was made a part of the amendments to title IV of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. 601 (Supp. V, 1970). Its purpose was to enable each
state to furnish financial assistance, as far as practicable under the
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conditions in such state, to needy dependent children. Social Services
to the family and financial support of the parents of ADC children were
intended to improve the home environment of needy children. Further,
it boosted adult ADC recipients toward economic independence; by
supporting dependent children it enabled a parent to work. It was felt
that the working parent is a good example to the child and will gain the
respect of the child more easily than a non-working parent.
WIN is administered by HEW and the Department of Labor,
participants are selected on the basis of the caseworker's evaluation of
the individual's potential to succeed in the program. Participants are
classified as immediately employable, or as one who may need special
training, and lastly, those who cannot benefit from special training are
placed in "special work projects." All of those selected are "educated"
until they are employable in some capacity. Ideally, the article suggests,
the program shows possibilities of solving some sociological problems
connected with the welfare recipients family reactions. However, the
result of the program has not been encouraging, and the dropout rate of
WIN enrollees has been extremely high, supporting the assertion that
many dropouts had been inappropriately referred. The Department of
Labor has adopted the policy that WIN training must be oriented
toward jobs in the "demand occupations" either in the long or short
run, and toward "career ladder" jobs.
The WIN program is not altogether conducive toward inspiring
participants either a serious interest in, or respect for, work. Mothers
are claiming they are forced to leave their children for a substantial part
of the day and that this is detrimental to the child. The "dignity,
self-worth, and confidence" assumed by Congress to flow from being
recognized as a worker will in fact never manifest in a mother unhappy
with her mandatory job and the loss of supervision over her children.
Were the WIN program simply a well-intentioned failure to provide jobs
for the country's indigent, that would be cause enough for lament; but
WIN may indeed result in unfairness to all the welfare working poor, in
that a WIN participant working at a job paying the same wage as a
non-participant receives an incentive payment in addition to this wage.
The program made too many erroneous assumptions about welfare
recipients and about the causes of poverty. WIN intervenes in the
poverty cycle at the locus of the individual rather than the labor
market. So long as poverty is viewed as simply a manifestation of
personal failure, congressional anti-poverty programs will be a waste of
bureaucratic energy.
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W.B. Turner, Establishing the Rule of Law in Prisons: A Manual for
Prisoners'Rights Litigation, 23 STAN. L. REV.473 (1971).
Until recently the complaints of prisoners about conditions of life in
prison were ignored by the courts. Judicial review was avoided; the
courts reasoned that the handling of persons convicted of crime was a
difficult task requiring considerable expertise that they did not possess.
Constitutional protections afforded the accused before and during the
trial process abruptly stopped at the point of sentencing. What
happened to the convicted after sentencing was neither a matter for
judicial nor public concern. Upon release, the experience of inmates
while in prison will largely determine their chances of becoming
productive and law-abiding citizens. The article deals with the rights of
prisoners while incarcerated; it is not concerned with sentencing,
probation, parole, or post-release civil disabilities. The area of concern
is the internal prison problems most frequently raised and litigated by
prisoners. Prison conditions are considered because jail inmates awaiting
trial theoretically enjoy the presumption of innocence and this may be
their argument for better treatment than convicted inmates.
Unlike officials of long-term prisons, jailkeepers generally do not
pretend that their detention facilities exist to rehabilitate those
committed to their custody. Noting the squalid conditions of the jails,
the conclusion is that it is crucial to litigate the rights of jail inmates.
This part of the corrections system affects more people than any other,
including first-timers as well as hardened criminals. Litigation on behalf
of jail inmates presents an opportunity to compel the legislature or the
public to devote attention and resources to the problem of alleviating
these oppressive conditions.
The author raises the issue of censorship, delay, and confiscation of
legal pleadings and correspondence, relating their progressive history
since 1941, when the Supreme Court held that prison officials could
not screen prisoners' writs of habeas corpus to ascertain whether they
met the prisoners' standards, Ex parte Hull 312 U.S. 546 (1941). It is
shown that censorship still exists, effectively estopping the prisoner
from appealing for assistance, from judges or other public officials. The
place, position and need for freedom of action is covered as it relates to
the jailhouse lawyer. Other problems are raised concerning freedom of
religion, censorship of reading material and correspondence, political
activities, medical care and racial discrimination and segregation.
The author considers problems of disciplinary punishments; the
limits, if any, on the kind and degree of punishment the prison
administration can inflict. Corporal punishment has been declared
"cruel and unusual punishment," Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. 2d 571
(8th Cir. 1968), as have tortures and other inhuman measures being in
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violation of the eighth amendment, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 675 (1962). Since punishments for prison infractions are so
closely related to the maintenance of prison discipline, the courts have
been reluctant to impose standards thereby subjecting administrative
decisions to judicial review, except in the most outrageous cases. The
article examines solitary confinement, punitive segregation, and maximum security, juxtaposing the result of these disciplinary proceedings
and the right to rehabilitative opportunities.
Federal jurisdiction and standards of judicial review are examined,
particuarly noting the "hands off" doctrine has raised issues that are
not being resolved in the state courts. These issues will most certainly
have to be resolved in the federal court system. Examination is made as
to habeas corpus and the civil rights acts as the two principal means of
seeking judicial review of internal state prison practices. The author
offers suggestions for litigation strategy. He considers prior pleadings,
the need for substantial pre-trial discovery and the problems of the trial
itself. Remedies are explored, including injunctive relief, damages,
costs, expenses and attorneys' fees. The author's conclusion is that
what happens in prison is of critical importance not only to the
relatively few offenders who are caught and convicted of crimes but
also to the nation, which faces a general crisis of crime control.
J. I. Newman & P. H. O'Donnell, A Poor Man in the Billion Dollar
Wasteland: Proposals for a National Linkage System, Poor People's
Bond, National Lottery, andJudibank, 59 GEO. L. J.1015 (1971).
The authors criticize the federal government's failure to employ new
innovative techniques in financing high priority social programs. The
article claims that the government's reluctance to explore and promulgate new programs has resulted in a veritable wasteland in which
bankrupt fiscal operations and program funding devices have failed to
tap numerous sources of public and private sources that could be
utilized to stimulate and initiate the economic development of
low-income communities. The authors claim that unutilized funds are
available in the neighborhood of five to ten billion dollars. The article is
supported with an Appendix noting present and proposed sources of
funds and existing models for the Federal Bonding and Linkage
Insurance Corporation.
The article's purpose is to construct a series of models for fiscal
management which, without significant supplemental congressional
appropriation, can be used to generate billions of dollars for new
programs and for existing financially handicapped programs aiding the
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socially and economically disadvantaged. Several potential solutions are
offered to alleviate the federal fiscal plight; a National Linkage System
to facilitate the secondary program making use of idle federal, state and
local government funds; a Poor People's Bond and a National Lottery
for the Poor. The proposed National Linkage System suggests the
depositing of all federal funds would be "linked to," or conditioned
upon, a bank's participation in programs designed to to assist minority
enterprises, consumer borrowing and education, ghetto redevelopment,
and other high priority domestic programs. The authors reason that the
placement of public money in banks no longer would be determined
solely by partisan politics and geographic considerations; rather through
tax and other incentives, state and local governments, private citizens,
corporations, labor unions, foundations and educational institutions
would be encouraged to deposit their funds in linkage banks.
The Poor People's Bond would be a special purpose U.S. Savings
Bond with the proceeds earmarked for specific social welfare programs
including the establishment of low-income credit unions and the
strengthening of legal services for the poor. The bonds would be issued
and guaranteed by a newly created Federal Bonding and Linkage
Insurance Corporation .(FBLIC).
The National Lottery for the Poor
is offered as a pragmatic approach toward existing gambling practices
and ghetto realities, to be administered by the FBLIC. The proceeds
from the lottery would be reserved for programs administered by the
linkage banks.
Uniquely, the article suggests that the responsibility of federal, state
and local courts should be enlarged, not only as the guardian of the
laws, but to include a more direct promotion of economic and social
justice. This would be accomplished by the courts acting not only as
trustees for millions of dollars in escrow and registry funds, but in
conjunction with the judibank concept. Money would be deposited in
linkage banks; in those inner-city communities not serviced by a bank
or its branch, courts would establish mechanisms by which these funds
could be made available for residents of the community. Thus the
FBLIC would be a hybrid among government organizations, it would be
nothing more than a public interest government corporation with the
special task of converting a multibillion dollar wasteland into a resource
for helping to solve the credit needs of-the nation's poor and near poor.
D. F. Fontaine, The Constitutional Law of Remedies in Welfare
Litigation, 23 ME. L. REV.41 (1971).
The author considers whether a federal court may award retroactive
payments in a class action by welfare recipients against state officers,
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when a state regulation or statute has been declared unconstitutional,
without regard to the question of whether the defendants acted in bad
faith. It is maintained that the result required, in light of the supremacy
clause and the equal protection clause, is a retroactive order of payment
to the injured class.
Not treated is the liability of subordinate governmental units, either
under respondeat superior, or for directed constitutional wrongs, nor is
the personal liability of state officials who commit tort-like wrongs
under color of their authority dealt with. Rather, the thesis of this
article is that welfare plaintiffs who have prevailed on their constitutional merits are entitled to an order of retroactive benefits from a
federal court against the pertinent state agency. It is reasoned that this
order is required not only as a matter of sound judicial administration
because 42 U.S.C. § § 1983, 1988 (1964) intended to create it, but also
as a matter of constitutional right whenever the decision on its merits is
based upon a constitutional infringement.
Included is a brief exposition of the alternatives that courts have
chosen using a wide selection of examples. The most noteworthy of
these is the case of Baxter v. Birkins, 311 F. Supp. 222 (D. Colo. 1970)
(three-judge court), in which the court granted retroactive benefits,
concluding that any other result would violate the spirit of the
supremacy clause.

